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Abstract 
In a duopoly model of vertical differentiation, we study market equilibrium and the resulting 
social welfare following an increase in the consumer’s willingness to pay (WTP) for products 
sold by socially responsible manufacturers. Different types of such changes emerge depending 
on their effects on consumer heterogeneity. We show that, in most cases, increases in the 
consumers’ social consciousness yield higher profits to socially responsible firms and may lead 
to higher levels of social welfare, provided that the market structure is left unchanged. However, 
when an increase in the consumer’s social consciousness changes the market structure, welfare 
may fall, while one of the duopolists’ profits rise. The resulting tension between private and 
social interests calls for a cautious attitude towards information campaigns aimed at increasing 
the consumer’s social consciousness. 
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1. Introduction 
In modern societies, people are increasingly aware of the impact of their consumption choices 
on the quality of public goods like, for example, the environment. Ostrom (2000) suggests that 
such an increasing trend in the consumer’s social awareness can be explained as an evolutionary 
process leading to the emergence and expansion of social norms fostering prosocial behavior. 
Bénabou and Tirole (2006) illustrate several cases of interaction between an individual’s self 
image and the social norms prevailing in the economy as a source of motivation for prosocial 
behavior. A practical consequence of these analyses is that private and public decisionmakers 
may affect the consumer’s social responsibility in order to induce the desired market outcomes. 
For obvious reasons, economists have been reluctant to study changes in welfare when 
preferences change. However, Stigler and Becker (1977) and Becker (1996) assume that, even 
when individual choices vary, the underlying preferences are stable, while people develop social 
and personal capital that changes their consumption decisions over time. Thus, the 
aforementioned increases in the consumers’ social responsibility can be seen as part of the 
personal and social capital formation process.     
 There are several empirical studies reporting measures of consumers’ WTP for green 
products.1 A look at the most recent of them confirms two broadly accepted facts which are 
central to our analysis. First, there is an increasing trend among consumers world-wide to prefer 
green products over their standard substitutes.2 Second, consumers are heterogeneous with 
respect to their WTP for green products.3   The issue of taste heterogeneity has been captured by 
most theoretical models studying the role of consumers’ ecological consciousness on market 
equilibrium. Approaches adopted by different authors vary in many ways, especially depending 
on whether consumer heterogeneity concerns their WTP for the ecological attribute itself, as in 
Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero (2002), or some other features like their income, as in 
Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) and Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003), or their ideal product 
variety, as in Conrad (2005). Taking the distribution of consumers’ valuations as given, all of 
these studies focus on standard policy instruments, like minimum environmental quality, taxes 
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and subsidies.4 To our knowledge, ours is the first normative approach to the issue of consumer 
heterogeneity5 in the context of a vertical differentiation model with application to markets with 
a public good externality.    
Various studies, Endres (1997) among them, propose the use of state campaigns as a 
means of increasing people’s ecological awareness. However, there seems to be no systematic 
recognition of the effect such campaigns may have on consumer heterogeneity and its effects on 
the economic and overall performance of the market. An example of heterogeneity-reducing 
changes in elicited degrees of environmental consciousness is provided by Tsagarakis and 
Georgantzís (2002), who present results from a survey responded before and after an 
informative session on the use of recycled water for irrigation. It is found that the informative 
session significantly increases the respondents’ willingness to use recycled water. Heterogeneity 
among respondents is reduced, given that the information provided during the session is more 
effective among those who had initially reported a lower willingness to use recycled water. 
Suzuki et al. (2004) present evidence for the contrary effect of information contingent on 
people’s initial environmental consciousness. In their study, the informative session is more 
effective among those who were initially more environmentally conscious. Thus, in terms of our 
framework, their reported information-led change in environmental consciousness is of the 
heterogeneity-enhancing type. Harris (2006) recognizes the effectiveness of environmental 
awareness campaigns in China among university students and the urban population. However, it 
is suggested that more satisfactory results would be reached if state campaigns were targeted 
towards those who have lower environmental knowledge and consciousness, like old people and 
rural populations. 
In all of these studies, the social desirability of increasing a population’s environmental 
consciousness seems to be taken for granted. Our analysis shows that this is not necessarily true 
without relying on the argument, used for example by Conrad (2005), that the social value of 
products manufactured by socially responsible firms may be overestimated by the consumer. 
Our framework illustrates the possibility of socially undesirable increases in the consumers’ 
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social responsibility using an argument similar to Rodríguez-Ibeas (2006). However, the 
description of tastes through two parameters, corresponding to the minimum and maximum 
valuation of a firm’s greenness, allows us to distinguish between heterogeneity-enhancing and 
heterogeneity-reducing changes in consumers’ social responsibility. The need for such an 
approach is dictated by the plausibility of the hypothesis that consumers with different initial 
attitudes towards social issues may be affected in different ways by changes in their personal 
capital caused by exogenous shocks like advertising or social trends.    
Following Baron (2001), committing to a socially beneficial investment is a form of 
strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our approach explains a firm’s CSR as a vertical 
differentiation strategy. Examples include cause-related marketing, eco-labeling, and corporate 
donations to “worthy” causes. Although many real-world examples of socially responsible 
behavior concern markets with an environmental externality, Bagnoli and Watts (2003) adopt a 
more broadly applicable framework in which a socially responsible manufacturer links his 
product to a public good, while in the absence of any prosocial concerns, the manufacturer does 
not link the product to such a public externality. 
Adopting the vertical differentiation framework by Mussa and Rosen (1978), we 
assume that, apart from the standard feel good effect perceived by the buyers of a green seller’s 
products, firms’ corporate strategies imply a contribution to a public good which is not captured 
by consumers’ valuations. Our basic assumption is that, all other being equal, consumers have 
some preference for products sold by socially responsible manufacturers. Increases in the 
consumers’ WTP for a firm’s CSR may increase or decrease consumer heterogeneity. We model 
the support of consumer tastes through two independent parameters between which valuations 
of CSR are uniformly distributed. Given the two degrees of freedom resulting from the two-
parameter description of tastes, we show that there are only three meaningful structures that 
should be analyzed in this framework: 1) duopoly with incomplete coverage of the market, 2) 
duopoly with complete coverage of the market and 3) monopoly with complete market 
coverage.  This generalization of the product differentiation framework allows us to consider 
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changes in the consumers’ WTP for green firms’ products leading to discontinuous jumps 
across different market structures. This feature of our model is responsible for our main results, 
which can be summarized as follows. 
 First, as preference heterogeneity increases, equilibria progress from monopoly, to 
duopoly with the full market covered, to duopoly without full coverage. Second, as consumer 
preferences shift toward more socially responsible ones, market structure can change in a 
welfare-reducing fashion. This is possible both for shifts that raise the concern for quality of 
less socially conscious consumers and for shifts that raise the environmental concerns of already 
highly responsible ones.   
 The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
theoretical model. In Section 3 we discuss the main results. Section 4 concludes. Appendix A 
provides the proofs of the main results. Appendix B compares equilibrium with the first best   
solution and discusses the implications of our framework for social welfare.   
 
2. The model 
Let a maximum of two potentially socially responsible firms sell a private product to a 
population of consumers. Consumer i’s utility from the consumption of up to one product unit 
from firm j, is given by: 
}0,max{ jjiij psU −= ν        (1) 
where { }2,1∈j , while js  denotes firm j’s degree of CSR, vi is consumer i’s valuation of a 
marginal increase in a firm’s CSR, and jp  is seller j’s price. The standard product is also sold 
in a perfectly competitive market at a price p, which is normalized to 0=p , by firms which 
cannot adopt any kind of CSR. Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume that when the 
market is not covered by the sales of the two firms, consumers can still buy the standard product 
in the competitive market enjoying the non CSR-related aspects of it. This implies that the 
product is perceived as differentiated by the consumers as long as at least one of the two firms 
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adopts a different level of CSR from its rival. Therefore, if one of the two firms wants to sell the 
product at a higher price than the competitive one, potentially yielding a positive profit, it must 
commit to a positive level of CSR.   
We normalize the consumers’ population to unity and assume that the consumer-
specific valuation parameters reflecting their preferences for firms’ CSR are distributed 
uniformly between m and n. By assuming that the density of the distribution is d= 1/(n-m), we 
keep the population of consumers constant in all types of changes in the distribution of v. 
Figure 1 presents the types of changes in the consumers’ social consciousness, which 
can be modeled as increases in one of the two taste parameters, m (example 1) and n (example 
2), or both of them (example 3). Given that this last case is a very special one, we focus on the 
first two types of changes. We use the term heterogeneity-reducing for the case of WTP changes 
depicted in example 1, and heterogeneity-enhancing for the case showed in example 2.  
Notice that we focus on the case of total-mass-preserving changes in the distribution of 
consumers, which could be due to, say, some prosocial campaign targeting the existing 
consumer population. To model non-mass-preserving ones would be of some interest, as an 
analogue of changes caused by the entry of new, more socially conscious consumers. However, 
although this alternative approach would produce qualitatively similar results to those reported 
here, it would not allow us disentangle the effects of changes in the consumer’s WTP for quality 
from the effects of increasing the total consumer population.   
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FIGURE 1: Examples of increases in consumers’ WTP for socially responsible firms’ products.  
 
Similar to Lutz et al. (2000), we assume that the firm’s degree of CSR implies a fixed 
cost which is a convex function of the firm’s level of social responsibility as denoted by: 
    2
2
1)( jjj sksC ⋅=               (2) 
We consider that firms first choose their level of social responsibility and then their 
price. We solve the two-stage decision problem following backward induction. Therefore, in all 
cases, we solve first for firms’ pricing decisions and then substitute into firms’ profit functions 
to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium degrees of social responsibility.  
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FIGURE 2: Market partitions under the three cases studied. 
 
Regarding the market structure, there are three relevant configurations: 1) Monopoly 
with Complete coverage of the market (for whose magnitudes we use the subscript MC), 2) 
Duopoly with Complete coverage of the market (denoted by DC), and 3) Duopoly with 
Incomplete coverage of the market (denoted by DI). Given that consumers buying the standard 
product in the competitive market enjoy zero utility, the part of the market which is not covered 
by the two firms’ sales contributes nothing to the social welfare and is equivalent to the case of 
zero consumption. We analyze each case separately, deriving the conditions under which each 
one of them will emerge. An asterisk denotes that the expression of a given magnitude 
corresponds to the subgame perfect equilibrium in each structure. Figure 2 shows each firm’s 
demand under each case.  
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2.1 Monopoly with Complete coverage of the market (MC) 
The monopolist will cover the whole market by fixing the maximum price that makes all 
consumers buy a unit of the product. This price equals the level at which the least socially 
conscious of all consumers values the seller’s degree of social responsibility (the one with the 
minimum vi ):  
   MCp  = m · MCs       (3) 
The firm’s revenue from selling at this price to the whole market is MCr = MCp  ·1= m · MCs  . 
Taking the cost of the firm’s level of social responsibility into account, the firm’s profit is given 
by MCπ  = MCr  - MCC = 22
1· MCMC kssm − , which has a single maximum for:  
*
MCs  =m/k       (4)  
At this level of social responsibility the firm’s price becomes: *MCp  = m2/k, yielding maximum 
profits:     *MCπ = k
m
2
2
             (5) 
We assume that social welfare is the sum of consumers’ utility due to the feel good 
effect from consuming a socially responsible firm’s product, plus the public good externality 
due to a firm’s CSR, minus the associated fixed cost. More detailed discussion of the 
consequences of our assumptions for social welfare is provided in the appendix. However, it 
must be noted that assuming a linear relation between a firm’s level of CSR and its associated 
contribution to the public good, is a simplifying but certainly restrictive way of modeling the 
public good externality as an increasing function of a firm’s social responsibility. Nevertheless, 
our main results on assessing the desirability of changes in the consumers’ social responsibility 
through discontinuous shifts across different market structures do not depend on the 
aforementioned linearity assumption.  
For the monopoly case considered here, given that all consumers buy a unit of the 
product, and that the firm has adopted the level of social responsibility in (4), social welfare is:   
  *MCSW  = k
nmksssnm MCMCMC 2
)2(
2
1
2
2*** +=−++    (6)   
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which is an increasing function of both extremes of the distribution of tastes m and n, whereas 
the monopolist’s choice of social responsible activity level, price and associated profits only 
depend on the minimum among all valuations of social responsibility in the market. Therefore, 
the monopolist’s interest is, in general, incompatible with social welfare maximization. This is a 
general property of the market-driven social responsibility studied here, as can be shown by 
comparison between equilibrium social welfare and the corresponding first best choices (see 
Appendix B). 
It would be reasonable to ask now whether the monopolist would rather leave a part of 
the market uncovered by raising the price to reach up to a consumer with a valuation of socially 
responsible sellers’ product of mvo > . Such a strategy would reduce its demand below 
maximal market coverage, yielding a higher profit margin. However, in the presence of a 
second firm, this will never happen given that the condition for the emergence of the incomplete 
coverage monopoly case (n>2m) coincides with the condition under which the second firm 
appears with a strictly positive share, equal to the part of the market left uncovered by the 
monopolist. Hence, the list of cases studied here is complete without the case of an incomplete 
coverage monopoly.    
 
2.2 Duopoly with Incomplete coverage of the market  (DI) 
Most of the analysis in this case closely follows Motta (1993). However, for the purposes of our 
analysis, we restate the main results in terms of the parameters m and n. In this structure, there 
are two marginal consumers. One, with valuation ( ) ( )DIDIDIDIDI ssppx 21211 −−= , who is 
indifferent between the two sellers, and another, with valuation DIDIDI spx 222 = , who is 
indifferent between buying from the less socially responsible firm and buying from the 
competitive market. The two firms’ demands are expressed as: 
  ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−−=
mnss
ppnq
DIDI
DIDI
DI
1
21
21
1     (23) 
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⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
−=
mns
p
ss
ppq
DI
DI
DIDI
DIDI
DI
1
2
2
21
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2 .         (24) 
Then, the revenues from the price-setting stage are: 
  ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−−=
mnss
ppnpr
DIDI
DIDI
DIDI
1·
21
21
11    (25) 
  ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
−=
mns
p
ss
pppr
DI
DI
DIDI
DIDI
DIDI
1
2
2
21
21
22    (26) 
whose derivatives must be equal to zero for the first order conditions of the Bertrand 
equilibrium to be satisfied, giving us the equilibrium of the price-setting stage: 
   
DIDI
DIDIDI
DI ss
ssnsp
21
211
1 4
)(2
−
−=     (27) 
   
DIDI
DIDIDI
DI ss
ssnsp
21
212
2 4
)(
−
−=     (28) 
yielding revenues: 
   2
21
21
2
1
2
1 )4)((
)(4
DIDI
DIDIDI
DI ssmn
sssnr −−
−=     (29) 
   2
21
2121
2
2 )4)((
)(
DIDI
DIDIDIDI
DI ssmn
ssssnr −−
−= .   (30) 
 
It is straightforward to apply the result shown by Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) to 
show that, for each firm, these revenue functions are concave in own levels of engagement with 
the socially beneficial activity. Also, the positive cross derivatives of equilibrium revenue with 
respect to the involvement of the rival firm with a socially beneficial activity indicate that social 
responsibility levels are strategic complements.  
Equilibrium in the first stage of the game requires:   
DI
DIDI
DIDIDIDIDI
DI
DI
DI
DI
DI
DI ks
ssmn
sssssn
s
C
s
r
s 1321
2
221
2
11
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
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+−⇒∂
∂=∂
∂⇒=∂
∂π
       (31)
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DIDI
DIDIDI
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DI ks
ssmn
sssn
s
C
s
r
s 2321
21
2
1
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2
2
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2
2
2
)4)((
)74(0 =−−
−⇒∂
∂=∂
∂⇒=∂
∂π
        (32) 
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whose simultaneous solution gives the equilibrium choices of firms in the first stage of the 
game. As the aforementioned authors observe, the equilibrium characterized by the solution of 
the system of (31) and (32) is guaranteed by the concavity of the revenue functions and the 
convexity of the cost function. We use expressions (31) and (32) in order to obtain an analytical 
solution for the subgame perfect equilibrium, where the ratio of marginal revenues must be 
equal to the ratio of marginal costs:  
  
DI
DI
DIDIDI
DIDIDIDI
DIDI
DIDI
s
s
sss
ssss
sr
sr
2
1
211
2
221
2
1
22
11
)74(
)234(4
/
/ =−
+−=∂∂
∂∂
   (33) 
 
Concerning this equation, Motta (1993) has already pointed out that it has a single real 
root7given by:  
   DIDI ss 21 ⋅= λ ,           (34) 
where 772672512339662.5=λ . Once this relation is used in the solution of the equation in 
(31), we obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of social responsibility:    
   3
23
*
1 )14)((
)74(
−−
−= λ
λλ
mnk
ns DI     (35) 
   3
22
*
2 )14)((
)74(
−−
−= λ
λλ
mnk
ns DI .    (36) 
With these levels of social responsibility chosen in the subgame perfect equilibrium of 
the game, equilibrium prices become:  
   4
33
*
1 )14)((
)1)(74(2
−−
−−= λ
λλλ
mnk
np DI     (37) 
   4
32
*
2 )14)((
)1)(74(
−−
−−= λ
λλλ
mnk
np DI .    (38) 
For these social responsibility levels and prices, firms’ shares are defined by the two 
marginal consumers’ conditions on the [m, n] interval:  
    
14
)12(*
1 −
−= λ
λ nx DI       (39) 
   
14
)1(*
2 −
−= λ
λ nx DI       (40) 
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which guarantees that for all positive values of n and non negative values of m the former is 
higher than the latter and that the higher boundary never exceeds n. However, the other 
restriction for this structure to emerge is satisfied if: 136517056774630.4*2 ≥⇒≥ nmx DI .  
In the subgame perfect equilibrium characterized here, both firms’ profits are positive 
and those earned by the more socially responsible firm are higher than the profits of the less 
socially responsible one as indicated by:         
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )2
4
26
244
*
1
0244386.0
142
74141874
mnk
n
mnk
n
DI −
⋅=−−
−⋅−−⋅−⋅⋅−= λ
λλλλλλπ   (41) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )2
4
26
43
*
2
00152741.0
142
74141274
mnk
n
mnk
n
DI −
⋅=−−
−⋅−−⋅−⋅⋅−= λ
λλλλλλπ   (42) 
 
Finally, the social welfare corresponding to equilibrium behavior under this market 
structure is given by:  
( )
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−
⋅
−=
=+−++ν⋅⋅ν+ν⋅⋅ν= ∫∫
30155.00691842.0
2
1
22
2*
2
2*
1
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1
*
1
21
mn
n
kmn
n
sskssdsdsSW DIDIDIDI
x
x
DI
n
x
DIDI
 (43) 
 
At this stage, it is helpful to summarize the conditions under which each one of the three 
market structures will emerge. Figure 3 gives a representation of the three conditions.   
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FIGURE 3: Equilibrium market structures. 
 
2.3 Duopoly with Complete coverage of the market and Corner pricing (DC) 
In this case, the two firms 1 and 2 are active in the market, with a strictly positive market share 
each. Previous studies by Ronnen (1991), Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) and Lehmann-
Grube (1997) have presented the main results obtained in this case. Below, we restate the 
solutions in terms of the taste parameters m and n.  
 Without loss of generality, we consider that one of the two firms chooses a higher 
degree of CSR than the other: DCs1 > DCs2 .6 Then, for any pair of prices DCp1 > DCp2 , leading to 
this market structure, there will be a consumer whose valuation of his supplier’s level of social 
responsibility will make him indifferent between the more responsible firm which charges a 
higher price and the less responsible firm charging a lower price. This marginal consumer’s 
valuation is ( ) ( )DCDCDCDCDC ssppx 21211 −−= . We can write each firm’s quota on the [m, n] 
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segment as DCd1   = n - DCx1  and DCd 2 = DCx1  – m, which, when multiplied by the consumer 
density d=1/(n-m) give us, respectively, each firm’s demand: 
  DCq1 = ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−−
mnss
pp
n
DCDC
DCDC 1
21
21     (7) 
  DCq2 = ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
−
mn
m
ss
pp
DCDC
DCDC 1
21
21 .    (8) 
 
We use expressions (7) and (8) to write the two firms’ revenue functions which are 
relevant for the decisions of firms in the price setting stage of the game:  
  DCr1 = DCp1 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−−
mnss
pp
n
DCDC
DCDC 1
21
21     (9) 
  DCr2 = DCp2 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
−
mn
m
ss
pp
DCDC
DCDC 1
21
21 .    (10) 
 
 From the derivative of each one of these expressions with respect to the corresponding 
firm’s price, we obtain the first order conditions for the equilibrium prices in the second stage of 
the game, whose solution gives equilibrium prices: 
  DCp1 = 3
))(2( 21 DCDC ssmn −−      (11) 
  DCp2 = 3
))(2( 21 DCDC ssmn −− .    (12) 
 The pair of equilibrium prices reveals that the choice of the same level of social 
responsibility would drive the price down to the competitive level, yielding zero profits to both 
firms. Also, from (12) we see that n must exceed 2m in order for the second firm’s price to 
exceed the competitive price 0=p , which also guarantees that the second firm’s quantity is 
positive. Otherwise, as we mentioned in the previous subsection, the first firm will act as a 
monopolist covering the whole market. 
Substituting the equilibrium prices obtained above, we can obtain the revenues of the 
two firms from the price-setting stage of the game: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16
 
)(9
)2)(( 221
1 mn
mnssr DCDCDC −
−−=    (13) 
   
)(9
)2)(( 221
2 mn
mnss
r DCDCDC −
−−= .   (14) 
In the space of values of m and n for which both firms’ equilibrium prices and quantities 
are non negative (that is, mn 2≥ ), thus guaranteeing that this structure does not collapse to the 
case of monopoly with complete market coverage, these expressions have a straightforward 
property:  
   
)(9
)2( 2
1
1
mn
mn
s
r
DC
DC
−
−=∂
∂
     (15) 
   
)(9
)2( 2
2
2
mn
mn
s
r
DC
DC
−
−−=∂
∂
.     (16) 
  
 A well known property of the model is that, due to the negative sign of (16), even in the 
absence of any cost associated with the firm’s choice of a socially responsible profile, the 
second firm will choose not to be a socially responsible one. Then, the only price that it can 
sustain in equilibrium is the competitive price, 0*2 =DCp . Also, from the positive sign of (15), 
if the choice of a socially responsible profile were costless, the first firm would adopt the most 
socially responsible profile available. But with the convex cost associated with a firm’s degree 
of social responsibility, an interior choice will be optimal as indicated by: 
)(9
)2(0·
2
1
)(9
)2)(( 2*
1
1
12
1
2
21
111 mnk
mns
s
sk
mn
mnssCr DC
DC
DC
DC
DCDC
DCDCDC −
−=⇒=∂
∂⇒−−
−−=−= ππ
(17)   
leading to the adoption of the price:  
     
)(27
)2( 3*
1 mnk
mnp DC −
−=                        (18)
   
This means that the socially responsible firm’s demand is  
   
)(3
*
1 mn
nmq DC −
+=      (19) 
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because the firm sells to consumers whose valuation of the socially responsible profile of the 
firms are in the interval [(n-m)/3 , n], while the remaining consumer population,  
   
)(3
)2(2*
2 mn
mnq DC −
−=      (20) 
buys the product from the second firm at the competitive price. While the competitive price 
yields the second firm zero profits, the socially responsible firm earns: 
   2
4
*
1 )(162
)2(
mnk
mn
DC −
−=π .    (21) 
 In this case, the social welfare corresponding to this equilibrium is  
( ) ( )[ ]
2
22
2*
1
*
1
3
2
*
1
*
)(162
218818)2(
2
11
mnk
mnmnnmnkssdvvs
mn
SW DCDC
n
mn
DCDC −
−−++−=−+−= ∫−  (22) 
The full coverage duopolistic structure has been studied under the assumption that the 
second firm cannot further raise its degree of social responsibility in order to set a higher price 
than the competitive one. This would imply leaving unserved some consumers with low 
valuations of the social responsibility aspect. This is analyzed in the following subsection. 
 
3. Welfare effects and profitability of changes in the consumer’s social responsibility  
In this section, we present the main results of our analysis. We are interested in assessing the 
profitability and welfare consequences of changes in the consumer’s WTP for a socially 
responsible firm’s products. We undertake this task, considering infinitesimal increases of m or 
n, which either leave the equilibrium market structure unchanged, or they shift the industry from 
one configuration to an “adjacent” one. 
 Regarding the profitability of increases in the consumer’s social responsibility, we show 
that Propositions 1.1 and 1.2 hold (proofs are given in the appendix): 
 Proposition 1.1: In any of the two duopolistic structures, infinitesimal increases in m 
or n, which do not affect the industry structure, are profitable for any firm, which in 
equilibrium adopts a positive level of social responsibility (both firms in DI and firm 1 
in DC). However, in DI, firms prefer heterogeneity-reducing changes to heterogeneity-
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enhancing ones, while the socially responsible firm in DC prefers the opposite. Also, in 
the monopoly case, the firm benefits only from increases in m (heterogeneity-reducing 
ones), whereas it remains indifferent towards changes in n.  
Proposition 1.2: Infinitesimal changes in the consumer’s social responsibility which 
shift the industry across “adjacent” industry structures, are profitable for:    
i) firm 1, if the market moves from DI to DC and from DC to MC.   
ii) firm 2, if the market moves to DI.  
Concerning the welfare consequences of increases in the consumer’s social 
responsibility, we show that propositions 2.1 and 2.2 hold (proofs in the appendix): 
Proposition 2.1: Provided that the industry structure is not affected, infinitesimal 
increases of either m or n are welfare improving in all industry structures considered. 
In all cases, social welfare increases more by heterogeneity-decreasing changes than by 
heterogeneity enhancing ones. 
Proposition 2.2: When an infinitesimal change in the consumer’s social responsibility 
shifts the industry across “adjacent” industry structures, social welfare exhibits 
discontinuous jumps downwards as we move from DC to DI, as long as m and n tend to 
points lying on the segment defined by (0, 0) and (0.5051411976895118, 
2.37031079556).  Social welfare is enhanced in a continuous way by increases in m (n), 
if the industry structure shifts from DC to MC (MC to DC). 
The main intuition behind these results is that, generally speaking, increasing the 
consumer’s WTP for a socially responsible manufacturer’s products can be beneficial for 
socially responsible sellers and the society as a whole. However, not all types of increases in 
consumers’ social responsibility intensify the incentives for a firm to engage in socially 
beneficial activities. Furthermore, not all types of increases in the consumer’s social 
consciousness are equally attractive to the two manufacturers and the society. For example, in 
MC, the firm would only benefit from increases in the least socially responsible consumers’ 
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awareness WTP while, as a duopolist, it would benefit from both heterogeneity-enhancing and 
heterogeneity-reducing changes, although it would prefer the former over the latter. In both 
structures with complete coverage of the market, the second firm earns zero profits. Thus, the 
second firm remains indifferent towards all types of changes, except for those leading to DI. 
Once this structure emerges in equilibrium, all agents’ interests with respect to m and n are 
compatible. 
FIGURE 4: Social Welfare as a function of m for n=1. 
 
Let us focus on the two cases mentioned in Proposition 2.2. As a general rule, we see 
that heterogeneity-enhancing increases in the consumers’ social responsibility favor the entry of 
a second firm and, eventually, incomplete coverage of the market. On the contrary, 
heterogeneity-reducing changes go into the opposite direction leading, in the margin, to the 
monopolization of the market. Figures 4-7 show us the behavior of equilibrium social welfare 
with respect to m and n. In particular, Figures 4 and 7 correspond to discontinuous but 
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monotonic increases of social welfare with respect to both types of increases in the consumer’s 
social responsibility. On the contrary, Figures 5 and 6 depict the case in which either 
heterogeneity-reducing or heterogeneity-enhancing increases in the consumer’s WTP for 
socially responsible firms’ products may reduce social welfare. As formally stated in 
Proposition 2.2, this happens following the shift from the Incomplete coverage Duopoly 
structure to the Complete coverage one (Figure 5) after some heterogeneity-reducing change, or 
due to the opposite shift (Figure 6) in the heterogeneity-enhancing case. 
 
FIGURE 5: Social Welfare as a function of m for n=4.705. 
 
 Therefore, the most systematic divergence between private and public interests is 
observed when an increase in the consumer’s social consciousness causes the market structure 
to change. Specifically, combined with proposition 1.2, the examples depicted in Figures 4-7 
indicate that there are several kinds of incompatibility of interests among the agents considered 
in our model. Figure 4 depicts the case of a globally welfare-enhancing increase in m, causing 
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the market structure to change from DI to DC, which, following proposition 1.2, is harmful for 
firm 2 and profitable for firm 1. On the contrary, Figure 5 depicts the case in which an increase 
in m may reduce social welfare if it causes the market structure to shift from DI to DC. This 
would also be harmful for firm 2 (not firm 1). Figure 6 corresponds to an example in which an 
increase in n may reduce welfare, if it causes the market structure to shift from DC to DI. Such a 
change would also be harmful for firm 1 (not firm 2). On the contrary, Figure 7 corresponds to a 
case of a globally welfare-improving increase in n, which would also benefit firm 2 (not firm 1) 
as we move from DC to DI.  
FIGURE 6: Social Welfare as a function of n for m=0.3. 
 Some further discussion is necessary on the intuition behind the welfare-reducing cases 
depicted in Figures 5 and 6. The heterogeneity-reducing increase in consumers’ social 
responsibility presented in Figure 5 corresponds to a discontinuous jump from incomplete to 
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complete market coverage duopoly. The decrease in welfare is the result of the effect of this 
structure on the incentives for firms to contribute to the public good. Remember that in the 
complete coverage duopoly case, firm 1 is the only one choosing to be socially responsible. 
This leads to an overall reduction in both firms’ (due to strategic complementarity) contribution 
to the public good, leading to a decrease in social welfare. The case depicted in Figure 6 
corresponds to a discontinuous jump from complete to incomplete market coverage. Thus, the 
decrease in social welfare is due to the utility loss from incomplete coverage of the market. In 
this case, a heterogeneity-enhancing increase in consumers’ social responsibility increases the 
two firms’ incentives to invest in CSR in order to differentiate from each other, but this also 
increases their incentives to set higher prices leaving uncovered a part of the market.  
The two welfare-reducing effects depicted in Figures 5 and 6 are also present in the 
cases represented in Figures 4 and 7, respectively. However, the values of n (Figure 4) and m 
(Figure 7) are such that the expected welfare-enhancing effect of increasing the consumer’s 
social awareness prevails. An interesting property of our model, also reflected on the figures 
and formally proved in the appendix, is that the transition from monopoly to complete coverage 
duopoly does not induce any discontinuous jump in equilibrium welfare. Therefore, increases in 
the consumers’ social responsibility which cause the market structure to shift from one of these 
cases to the other, are unambiguously welfare-enhancing. Finally, note that in each one of the 
two welfare-reducing cases in Figures 5 and 6, one of the two firms (firm 1 in the former and 
firm 2 in the latter) is better off. An important implication of this result is that there will always 
be a private agent who can benefit from a welfare-reducing increase in the consumers’ social 
responsibility.  
These findings should not be mistakenly interpreted as a trivial consequence of the fact 
that the differentiation motive does not provide the right incentives for the private providers of a 
public good to adopt the socially optimal provision levels. This point is discussed in detail in 
Appendix B and the main intuition behind it is the fact that the differentiation motive leads the 
two firms to adopt different levels of CSR from each other, whereas the first best solution is 
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symmetric with respect to s. Here, rather than a comparison between first and second best 
solutions, our findings concern the comparative statics of market equilibrium under different 
types of increase in the consumer’s social consciousness. Our general policy recommendation is 
that increasing the consumer’s social consciousness should not be seen as a globally desirable 
objective to aim at. 
 
FIGURE 7: Social Welfare as a function of n for m=1. 
   
 
 
4. Conclusions 
Our theoretical framework explains corporate social responsibility as a costly differentiation 
strategy. Consumers are heterogeneous in their reservation prices for a marginal increase in their 
supplier’s commitment to socially beneficial action, like the protection of the natural 
environment. We pay special attention to the impact of changes in consumers’ social 
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responsibility on consumer heterogeneity and on the market outcome. As one would expect, we 
find that, ceteris paribus, a socially responsible producer benefits from selling to a market with 
more responsible consumers. Interestingly, we find that firms with lower degrees of social 
responsibility may also benefit from selling to a market with more socially responsible 
consumers.  
 Despite its similarity with income increases, raising the consumer’s WTP for the 
products of socially responsible firms is far from a trivial equivalent to ‘throwing money into 
the market’. This is especially true when increases in the WTP for socially responsible firms’ 
products cause the market structure to change. The main message of our analysis is that 
increasing the consumer’s WTP for the products of socially responsible firms is not 
monotonically beneficial, neither to the society nor to socially responsible entrepreneurs.  
Our analysis is appropriate for assessing the private profitability and social welfare 
effects of exogenous factors, which are perceived in different ways by consumers with different 
attitudes towards social issues. A rather generic result concerns the fact that, in most cases, 
changes in consumers’ WTP that are privately profitable are not necessarily the most desirable 
in terms of social welfare. In fact, it is neither easy to obtain interest compatibility between 
competing manufacturers nor compatibility between private profitability and social welfare. An 
apparently counterintuitive result emerging from the similarity between consumer heterogeneity 
and product differentiation is that, even the less socially responsible manufacturer may find it 
profitable to sell to a more socially responsible consumer population.   
 A straightforward policy implication of our results is that, while privately profitable 
campaigns should not be generally considered to be socially undesirable, the opposite cannot be 
guaranteed either. In other words, only campaigns carefully designed as welfare-enhancing 
devices, should be trusted by the society as a whole. Otherwise, the existence of privately 
profitable but potentially welfare-reducing consumer-awareness messages seems to be a non-
negligible threat for modern markets. On one hand, heterogeneity-enhancing campaigns 
inducing jumps from complete to incomplete market coverage may be welfare-reducing due to 
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utility loss from unserved consumers. On the other hand, heterogeneity-reducing campaigns 
yielding jumps from incomplete to complete market coverage may decrease welfare because of 
reduced incentives for firms to contribute to the public good. In each one of these welfare-
reducing cases, one of the two firms is better off, illustrating the incompatibility between private 
and public interests.  
Although we would not like to exaggerate the possibilities of state intervention in such 
detailed qualitative aspects of social trends and targeted awareness campaigns, it should be clear 
that firms’ attempts of providing the consumer with more information on the quality of their 
products and their corporate strategies regarding socially desirable objectives should be 
challenged against our main finding concerning the incompatibility of private and social 
interests.  
 As Comanor and Wilson (1979) have already pointed out, advertising undertaken by 
firms may increase the consumers’ WTP for a more expensive product and relax price 
competition. This unambiguous result concerning the relation between changes in WTP and 
market power becomes less easy to apply by policy makers in the real world, if the effect of 
those changes on consumer preferences and the resulting utility is taken into account.8 That is, 
more information about a firm’s social objectives may result in higher prices, but people paying 
higher prices for those products may be happier because this information makes them like the 
products they consume more. Then, the comparison of pre- and post-information prices under 
the assumption that pre- and post-information products are essentially the same may yield 
misleading conclusions. It would seem that, when markets have an externality on a public good 
like the environment, which can be objectively evaluated in terms of social welfare, the effects 
of changes in the consumers’ WTP become easier to assess. Contrary to this conjecture, we find 
that the same factors that increase the consumer’s WTP for the product of a socially responsible 
manufacturer may change the industry structure and reduce social welfare. 
 Different approaches to the aspects of CSR omitted here are discussed in Windsor 
(2006) and Baron (2007). The robustness of our results with respect to further generalizations, 
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like non total-mass-preserving changes in the distribution of consumer tastes, and the numerous 
applications of this very simple framework to study other issues related with changing the 
consumers’ attitude towards quality, leave a lot of space for future research. 
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End Notes 
1. For example, Camacho et al. (2004) compare revealed and hypothetical/stated measures of the 
consumer’s higher WTP for a recyclable office table as compared with the standard (non-recyclable) 
variety. They find that survey data are a good predictor of a consumer’s median WTP for an 
improvement in the environmental performance of a marketed good.  
2. Pham and Rambo (2003), Harris (2006), Suzuki et al. (2004) and Tsagarakis and Georgantzís (2002) 
use very different approaches to document the increasing trend of ecological consciousness in four 
different countries: Vietnam, China, Japan and Greece, respectively. In fact, the last two explicitly deal 
with the role of information as a means of increasing people’s willingness to accept costlier options 
favoring environmentally friendlier market outcomes. 
3.  Explicit references to the existence and the causes of such heterogeneity can be found, for example, in 
Blamey (1997) where willingness to pay depends on personal attributes like awareness of environmental 
need, consequences of and responsibility for personal action and acceptance of policy initiatives. 
Loureiro and Lotade (2005) identify different factors that may be responsible for heterogeneous 
valuations of products with an eco-label. At a theoretical level, Nyborg’s (2000) framework could be 
used to explain different levels of social consciousness as different combinations of homo oeconomicus 
and homo politicus in the consumers’ utility functions. 
4. Due to their focus on environmental quality standards, taxes and subsidies, these papers are rather 
weakly related to our main argument concerning the role of changes in consumers’ WTP. Nevertheless, 
due to the similarity between ours and their underlying theoretical frameworks, it is worth mentioning the 
studies by Constantatos and Sartzetakis (1999) on environmental taxes, Motta and Thisse (1999) on 
environmental quality standards and Nadaï and Morel (1999) on eco-labeling. Recently, Innes (2006) 
used a product differentiation model, which is similar to ours to address the issue of consumer boycotts. 
Apart from Conrad’s (2005) model, Deltas et al. (2004) also develop a horizontal differentiation model 
with some vertical differentiation flavor, but as stated before both papers’ objectives are different to that 
pursued here. On the standard policy instruments, Lyon and Maxwell (2002) provide a very insightful 
overview with special emphasis on the existing empirical findings and Lutz et al. (2000) who use a fairly 
general vertical product differentiation framework to show that if the high quality firm can commit to a 
quality level before regulations are promulgated, it induces the regulator to weaken standards, and 
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welfare falls. This last study highlights the dangers of lengthy delays between legislative mandates for 
new regulations and their implementation. The key difference between their model and earlier models of 
minimum quality standards (like Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995) is the timing of firm and government 
actions: now the high-quality firm has the leadership role. Finally, Crampes and Hollander (1995) rule 
out sunk costs and show that a low-quality producer benefits from a mildly restrictive quality standard 
whereas a high-quality producer suffers from it. Consumers’ welfare increases if the firm producing the 
higher quality does not increase its quality significantly in response to the increase in quality by its rival.  
5. Market effects of changes in the distribution of consumer types have been studied by von der Fehr and 
Stevik (1998) and Bloch and Manceau (1999). However, these papers study persuasive advertising in the 
context of horizontal differentiation. 
6. Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) give a detailed proof why firms will never choose s1=s2, which also 
holds in our case.  
7. And two imaginary ones given by is DI 564509.0249383.01 ±= . A Mathematica program computing 
these roots is available upon request.  
8. Becker and Murphy (1993) analyze advertising as a product jointly sold together with other 
conventional products, suggesting that a changing tastes framework is not necessary in order to explain 
changes in consumers’ attitudes towards advertised products. 
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Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2 
We provide here the proofs of the main results. 
Proof of Proposition 1.1: In the monopoly and the complete coverage duopoly cases only firm 
1 earns positive profits. From expression (5) we get 
k
m
m
MC =∂
π∂
, while 0=∂
π∂
n
MC , which 
indicate that the monopolist only benefits from increases in the least social responsible 
consumer’s willingness to pay. In the duopoly with complete market coverage, the derivatives 
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 show that the socially responsible 
firm benefits from both types of increases in the consumers’ WTP: those decreasing and those 
increasing consumer heterogeneity, although the latter benefit the firm more given that the 
second of these derivatives is strictly higher than the first one in the relevant range of 
parameters (n>2m). Finally, in the incomplete coverage duopoly case, both firms’ profits are 
affected by changes in n and m. Apart from firm specific parameters in expressions (41) and 
(42), the sign and size of the derivatives of profits with respect to n and m behave in the same 
way as 
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, which indicate that 
both firms benefit from both types of increases, although they prefer heterogeneity reducing 
ones (those affecting m). 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.2: We turn to changes in m and n causing the industry structure to 
change. First, some straightforward observations are in order. Firm 2 has a clear preference for 
the incomplete duopoly case, since it is the only one in which it invests in a strictly positive 
level of social responsibility, earning positive profits. In DC, this firm covers a part of the 
market, but its zero investment in socially beneficial activities drives its price down to the 
competitive level and its profits to zero. In the monopoly case, the second firm is left with zero 
output and profits. Preferences for firm 1 over industry configurations follow the inverse order, 
with the monopoly being the most preferred structure, whereas the incomplete coverage 
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duopoly is the least preferred market configuration. In fact, the transition from DC to MC 
involves no discontinuous “jumps” (see Figures 4-7) as can be shown by the limit of firm 1’s 
profits in the DC case which tends to the monopolist’s profits as n approaches 2m: 
( )
( ) MCDCmn k
m
mnk
mn π==−
−=π→ 2162
2lim
2
2
4
12
 (see expressions (5) and (21)). In an analogous way, 
we calculate the limits of firm 1’s profit in (21) and (41) as n approaches the boundary condition 
separating the complete and incomplete duopoly cases. Here we find a discontinuous “jump” 
upwards of the firm’s profit as we switch from the incomplete to the complete coverage duopoly 
case, as can be shown from the inequality:  
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Proof of Proposition 2.1: We compute the derivatives 
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, note that increases in m 
have a strictly higher impact on social welfare than increases in n. Therefore, heterogeneity-
reducing increases in the consumer’s social responsibility are socially preferable to 
heterogeneity enhancing ones. For the case of a duopoly with incomplete coverage, we focus on 
the behavior of the term 
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 in expression (43), with respect to m and n. Observe that it is 
increasing in both taste parameters. Indeed, ( ) 02
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values of m, which indicates that social welfare is enhanced more rapidly by increases in the 
least socially responsible consumers’ WTP, than in the most socially responsible one’s. Finally, 
we study the sign of: 
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 which, given the 
restriction [ ]mmn 3337056765174.4,2∈ , coincides with the sign of the term 
322232 24181945627 nmnnnmmnmm +++−−+  whose equality with zero gives an 
equation with only imaginary roots within the aforementioned interval of n. Arbitrary values of 
m and n (say, 1 and 3, respectively) give a positive sign for the derivative which, given the lack 
of real roots, does not change within the relevant range of parameters. Similarly, the sign of: 
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both lying outside the interval of m satisfying [ ]mmn 3337056765174.4,2∈ . Thus, the sign of 
the derivative studied here remains unchanged in the area of relevant values. An arbitrary pair 
of values for m and n from the interval permitted (say 1 and 3, respectively) give a positive sign 
for the derivative.
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.2: To assess the social desirability of changes in consumers’ social 
responsibility that affect the industry structure, we check the limits of expressions (6) and (21) 
as n approaches the boundary condition separating the MC and DC cases. In an analogous way, 
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we check the limits of expressions (22) and (43) as n approaches the boundary condition 
separating the DC and DI cases. First, like in the case of firm 1’s profits, it can be easily 
checked that social welfare behaves in a continuous way around the boundary condition 
mn 2= , that is, as we move from DC to MC and vice versa. This is due to the equality between 
( )
k
mmSWMCmn
+=→
1lim *
2
 and 
( )
k
mmSWDCmn
+=→
1lim *
2
. This is not the case for the social 
welfare around the boundary condition n= 4.7056765174333m separating the two duopoly 
cases. Furthermore, “the jump from one case to the other” does not have an ambiguous effect on 
social welfare. This can be shown by solving *
3337056765174.4
*
3337056765174.4
limlim DCmnDImn SWSW →→ =  
with respect to m, which has a unique positive real root for m=0.5051411976895118. Therefore, 
the point ( )** ,nm  = (0.5051411976895118, 2.3703107955668) defines two subspaces along 
the n= 4.7056765174333m line across which switching from incomplete to complete coverage 
duopolies has either a positive (from ( )** ,nm  towards the beginning of the axes) or a negative 
(from ( )** ,nm  outwards) effect on social welfare.  
 
Appendix B. Social Welfare Analysis: First Best vs. Equilibrium 
We briefly discuss here the implications of our framework regarding social welfare in the first 
best and second best solutions. Technical details concerning the derivation of these results are 
available upon request. 
The First Best Solution: Consider a regulator who is facing the following problem: A 
maximum of two suppliers, 1 and 2 may provide a public good by committing to a provision 
level, { }2,1, ∈isi , yielding costs given by the convex function in (2). Following our 
assumptions, there are three components in the expression giving us the level of social welfare 
achieved in each structure: 1) A market-based one related with the feel good effect experienced 
by the buyers of the private good when purchasing it from a producer who is committed to some 
level of socially beneficial activities, 2) the level of public good generated by the producers 
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whose quantity is a one-to-one transformation of the supplier’s effort and involvement in a 
socially beneficial activity, and 3) the producers’ costs from their prosocial behavior. We pay 
attention to the case in which the regulator must choose between a single- and a two-supplier 
provision structure and fix the optimal level of 0ii ss =  to be provided. The two suppliers also 
sell a private good, whose consumers enjoy some extra utility from buying the product from a 
socially responsible firm. All assumptions concerning such a socially responsible consumers’ 
utility and the distribution of valuations of a socially responsible firm are kept as outlined in the 
main text. Notation for two-supplier (TWO) and one-supplier (ONE) first best solutions is 
introduced in order to distinguish them from equilibrium structures.  
 While the comparison of total and individual optimal contributions in the one- and two-
supplier first best solutions can be ranked in a straightforward way ( ≥0TWOs ≥0ONEs 0iTWOs ), the 
condition for the two-supplier provision structure to be socially preferable over the single-
supplier one is:    
≥++=
k
nmSWTWO 16
)4( 20
2
2
8
)2( 20 nm
k
nmSWONE
+≥⇒++=    (44) 
 Given the decreasing returns to scale in the production of the public good favoring 
provision by many small plants rather than by fewer larger ones, the result in (44) may be 
considered a rather counterintuitive implication of our setup. However, we must not forget that 
the consumption-related utility of the public good is constant and equal to the average value of a 
firm’s social responsibility in the market. Therefore, parallel to the decreasing returns of the 
production technology, we have “decreasing returns to plant number” in the generation of the 
consumption-related feel good effect experienced by the consumer who buys from a socially 
responsible seller. This is why, we get that if the market-related value of social responsibility 
exceeds the threshold given by (44), the decreasing returns to plant property dominates the 
production-related decreasing returns to scale and thus, the single-supplier structure is preferred 
by the regulator.  
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Comparing the Market and the First Best Solutions: One important question to ask is under 
which market conditions the maximum social welfare will be reached. That means that, for 
example, we should look for the conditions under which the complete coverage monopoly 
reaches the first best. Figure 8 depicts the areas of the parameters m and n in which the first best 
and the actual equilibrium market structure coincide.  
FIGURE 8: Comparison of equilibrium and socially optimal market structures. 
 
 We compare the first best solution above with the equilibrium market structures 
emerging for different combinations of the consumers’ taste parameters. Figure 8 plots four 
straight lines. Three of them, the upward sloping ones, correspond to the boundary conditions 
between pairs of equilibrium market structures, whereas the fourth, which is downward sloping, 
is the condition which determines whether the single- or the two-supplier structure will be 
preferred by the regulator.  
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 Of course, coincidence between the equilibrium and the first best provision structures 
does not imply that the first best outcome will be achieved. On the contrary, we will show that, 
in general, this will not be the case. However, the mapping of equilibrium market structures 
against the first best solution is a necessary step when assessing the sources of divergence 
between market equilibrium and socially optimal provision structures. 
 First of all, we find that the monopolist will always adopt a less socially responsible 
profile than is socially optimal. Second, given that the second firm in a duopoly with full market 
coverage does not adopt a socially responsible profile at all, it always adopts a less responsible 
profile than is socially optimal. In fact, the result of under-provision of the public good 
externality by the second firm can be extended in a less straightforward way to the case of 
incomplete coverage despite the fact that the firm commits to some level of socially beneficial 
activities.    
 A further general result is that due to the differentiation motive of socially responsible 
behavior shown to exist for both the incomplete and the complete coverage cases, the two firms 
will systematically avoid the social welfare-maximizing adoption of equal levels of engagement 
with socially beneficial activities. This is a persistent and robust source of divergence between 
the asymmetric social responsibility levels chosen by firms and the symmetric choice required 
in the corresponding first best solution.   
After having established that the second firm’s choice will always be below the level 
corresponding to the first best, we compare the more responsible firm’s choices with the 
corresponding first best. We find that, in general, firm 1 (the socially responsible one) may both 
under- or over-provide the public good externality entailed in its socially beneficial behavior, 
depending of the magnitude of the taste parameters. Combinations of high values for m and n 
lead to the overprovision result, implying that the consumers’ high valuation of a firm’s social 
responsibility may lead firm 1 to the adoption of an excessively high level of CSR.  
